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RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Fenner failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
underlying, unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed, upon the jury’s verdict finding
him guilty of grand theft?

Fenner Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A jury found Fenner guilty of grand theft for stealing from his employer, and the district
court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.
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(R., pp.18-25, 170-72, 277-78, 287-91.)

Fenner filed a notice of appeal timely from the

judgment of conviction. (R., pp.292-294.)
Fenner asserts his underlying sentence is excessive because he has previously completed
a period of probation and because he accepted responsibility, had a “promising job prospect,”
apologized to the victim, and claimed that “being sent to prison would cause a lot of strain on his
family.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.2-4.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
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prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for grand theft is 14 years. I.C. §§ 18-2407(1)(b)(8), 2408(2)(a). The district court imposed an underlying, unified sentence of 10 years, with two
years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.287-91.) On Appeal, Fenner
argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion in light of his claim that he had
“finished his probationary term and was making progress” and because he accepted
responsibility, apologized to the victim, had a “promising job prospect,” and claimed that “being
sent to prison would cause a lot of strain on his family.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.) However,
these factors do not outweigh the seriousness of the offense, Fenner’s poor performance during
his previous probationary period, or his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite prior legal
sanctions and treatment opportunities.
In 2008, Fenner pled guilty to rape and lewd conduct. (Conf. Exh., pp.1, 9; Tr., p.1137,
Ls.1-2.) At sentencing in this case, the prosecutor summarized the events that followed Fenner’s
guilty plea in the 2008 case, noting that the district court in that case retained jurisdiction so that
Fenner would have the “needed building blocks in place” to eventually “be successful on
probation.” (1/23/18 Tr., p.1137, Ls.1-11.) Fenner performed poorly on his first rider; “he did
not engage in his sex offender treatment” and the district court stated at that time that Fenner did
not “seem to get it.” (1/23/18 Tr., p.1137, Ls.12-15.) After concluding Fenner did not “seem to
be on the proper medication for his ADD/ADHD, … the [c]ourt gave him an opportunity to go
back and do [a second] rider … to see how he would do on the proper medication.” (1/23/18 Tr.,
p.1137, Ls.16-22.) Fenner did not “fare much better” on his second rider; he failed “to complete
any part of his case plan,” had “lower than average participation,” and did not “make use of
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treatment,” leading rider staff to conclude “his success on probation would be unlikely.”
(1/23/18 Tr., p.1137, L.23 – p.1138, L.4.) Despite his poor performance on both riders, the
district court “reluctantly” placed Fenner on probation for seven years. (1/23/18 Tr., p.1138,
Ls.5-10.)
Fenner’s performance while on probation was abysmal. He failed to obtain employment
within the first year of his period of supervision and, as a result, was required to serve five days
of administrative jail time in December 2010. (1/23/18 Tr., p.1138, Ls.11-19.) That same
month, Fenner’s probation officer filed a report of violation alleging that Fenner failed to
complete community service, failed to attend a financial workshop, failed to maintain
employment, had only made one payment toward his financial obligations, and failed to report to
his probation officer. (1/23/18 Tr., p.1138, L.20 – p.1139, L.2.) Fenner was then given a
polygraph, and “during the prepolygraph questions he admitted to [having] four sexual partners,”
only one of whom he had disclosed to his probation officer. (1/23/18 Tr., p.1139, Ls.3-6.) In
August of 2011, Fenner’s probation officer filed another report of violation alleging Fenner had
frequented a place his probation officer had specifically instructed him not to go and had failed
to maintain employment. (1/23/18 Tr., p.1139, Ls.9-21.) Several months later, Fenner twice
admitted to having used marijuana on multiple occasions over the several previous months and,
as a result, was again required to serve administrative jail time. (1/23/18 Tr., p.1139, L.22 –
p.1140, L.2.) Fenner’s probation officer thereafter filed a third report of violation alleging
Fenner missed appointments with his probation officer, consumed alcohol, tested positive for and
admitted to having smoked marijuana, missed individual and group treatment, and was
unsuccessfully discharged from treatment. (1/23/18 Tr., p.1140, Ls.3-12.) His probation officer
noted at the time that Fenner had “done the bare minimum to get by” and, when he was
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employed, he “seem[ed] to have a lot of problems with his employers.” (1/23/18 Tr., p.1140,
Ls.13-18.)
In January 2016, Fenner’s probation officer received information that Fenner was
“sending videos of himself masturbating, via text messages, to a female, in addition to having
several sexual conversations with her.” (1/23/18 Tr., p.1140, Ls.19-25.) Fenner “failed to
disclose his sex offender treatment to this person and had a functioning camera on his cell phone,
in addition to video taping pornographic images, all a violation of his sex offender probationary
terms.” (1/23/18 Tr., p.1141, Ls.1-5.) Fenner’s probation expired in September 2016, before the
state was aware of some of Fenner’s conduct that would have formed the basis for another
probation violation. (1/23/18 Tr., p.1141, Ls.6-12.)
In July 2016, while Fenner was still on probation in the 2008 rape/lewd conduct case,
Fenner’s employer reported to law enforcement that Fenner had been stealing from his company.
(R., pp.18-25.) Fenner made multiple purchases on his employer’s account at Moscow Building
Supply without authorization over a period of six months. (R., p.18.) Fenner claimed that it was
his understanding that he did not need permission to purchase anything, and that any personal
purchase made on the account would be deducted from his paycheck; however, no other
employee had that understanding, and Fenner also admitted that nothing was ever deducted from
his paycheck. (R., pp.21-22.) Fenner was charged with grand theft (R., pp.170-72, and a jury
found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (R., pp.277-78).
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Fenner’s sentence. (1/23/18 Tr., p.1150, L.17
– p.1153, L.7.)

Although Fenner technically completed his prior period of probation—a

probation that, as noted above, was riddled with violations and illegal behavior—apologized to
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the victim, and had a couple of job prospects that Fenner himself characterized as “not great” and
“nothing fancy and nothing extravagant” (1/23/18 Tr., p.1150, Ls.5-10), none of these factors
outweigh Fenner’s continued criminal conduct or his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite
prior treatment opportunities and legal sanctions. The state submits that Fenner has failed to
establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the
sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Fenner’s conviction and sentence.

DATED this 7th day of February, 2019.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of February, 2019, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.
__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

wi11ing to do what needs to be done to make it right.
um,

I

guess, whatever Your Honor sees fit.

would prefer probation so that

I

can

I

support my Fami1y and pay my restitution, um, and get
a1]

my other bi11s caught up.

got

a

a

possibIe job.

Um,

Um,

1ike we stated,

it's not great,

but

I

I've

do have

friend in St. Mary's who is trying to he1p me find

job up there,

too.

possib11ities.

Um,

Um,

so I do have a coup1e

they're nothing Fancy and nothing

10

extravagant, but it's income.

ll

fast Food joint to pay Mr. Daig1e back,

12

wronged him and

And if

I

have to go to

a

——

I

I

w111.

I

want to make it right.

I

THE COURT:

l3

Thank you, Mr.

Fenner.

Does the

14

defendant have any 1awfu1 cause to show why judgment

15

shou1d not be pronounced against him at this time?
HUNTER:

16

MS.

17

THE COURT:
go back

N0,

We11,

Your Honor.
it's true,

Mr.

Fenner, you

to say that it's

18

and

19

disheartening to see you commit new fe1onies ~v or

20

new fe1ony whi1e you were on probation wou1d be an

21

understatement.

22

than that.

23

the ru1es and not abused your responsibi1ity, we

24

wou1dn't be having this conversation.

25

what you did and that 15 what we're here for.

I

a

a

1on9 ways.

I

um.

a

thought you had come a 1ot farther

You had a good job.

Had you just f011owed

Um,

but that is
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So on the grand theft charge,

I'm imposing

a

sentence of not Tess than two and not more than ten
years in the State penitentiary.

If this were the on1y

charge that had brought you before me, this wou1dn't be
but because

the sentence,

I

do have the history with

you and do want to see you succeed and change, most

important1y, I'm imposing that sentence.
I

am going to retain jurisdiction.

somewhat re1uctant1y, but

I

do so for

a

I

do it

coup1e of

10

reasons, one of which,

ll

of changing.

12

is that I think that there are new programs avai1ab1e

13

t0 you at Cottonwood that weren't availab1e to you

14

before.

15

undertake and comp1ete cognitive behaviora1

16

intervention substance abuse and cognitive behaviora1

17

intervention sex offense.

I

think you have the capabi1ity

Another reason I'm retaining jurisdiction

So I'm specifica11y recommending that you

I'm not yet persuaded that you are not at

18
19

risk of reoffending with a sex crime.

20

behavior you engaged in whi1e on probation and being

given the

watched by your probation officer.
I'm also ordering —— or recommending to the

22

23

Department of Correction that you participate in

24

thinking for

25

treatment.

a

change and anger rep1acement therapy 0r

I'm not sure which 77 whether it's
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treatment or training.
I'm imposing restitution t0 Daig1e

Contracting

1'n

the amount of $1,711.01.

am imposing

I

court costs 1n the amount of $245.50.
It's a 1on9 day.

It's been a 1ong time

getting to the day we are at now.

um,

don't have

I

a

good epranation For why it's taken as 1on9 as it has.
If

cou1d have compressed that time, in retrospect

I

w0u1d have, but

I

didn't think

I

cou1d.

I

but one of

um,

10

the reasons we're here today is because you've dragged

ll

your feet.

12

I

13

um,

l4

I'm mad at.

I

I'm trying t0 get over that.

Uh.

a1so want to te11 you.

Mr.

Fenner, that

try not to send peop1e to the penitentiary that
I'm c1ear1y mad at you.

disappointed in you.

C1ear1y

C1ear1y disheartened by your

16

behavior.

l7

you don't do

18

wi11

19

re1inquish your —— my jurisdiction over you, and have

2O

the sentence served.

a

I

expect you to go on this rider, and if

ste11ar job and show me that you can and

change, my expectation wou1d be that

21

You have the abi1ity t0 appea1

22

decision.

23

wi11

24

appea1.

25

But

I

wou1d

this

If you cannot afford counse1, one can and

be appointed for you in the bringing of that

mr.

Fenner,

I

think that the State made a

SHERYL ENGLER, RPR, CSR — LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
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+4

very strong argument for my not retaining jurisdiction.
I

be1ieve in redemption.

change.

don't think

I

be1ieve in the power to

I

wou1d do this job 1f

I

I

didn't.

And I'm hoping that you can and wi11 show me that you

r

a
I

can Change.

You have a Wot more responsibility now

than you did when
up.

Is

I

It's time to grow

First met you.

there anything e159 we have to take up?
MS.

JENNINGS:

Your Honor, do you want to

set a rider review date?
10

I'm going to guess it's going to

THE COURT:

11

take 1onger than six months to comp1ete,

12

tentative1y schedu1ing it for September 24th at 3:30

13

p.m.
MS.

HUNTER:

Your Honor,

if you do not do this ever, and

impertinent, but, um,

I

I

I,

so I'm

um —- forgive me

don't want to appear

be1ieve Mr. Fenner, due to the

17

sentencing date being set 50 c1059 to the —— to the

18

verdict,

19

custody arrangements for his daughter.

20

way he cou1d have a coup1e days before he's to report

21

to the jai] to do that?

22

um,

he may need some time to Figure out

THE COURT:

—
A5

No.

I

23

1on9 time t0 get to this day. and

24

day.

25

Is there any

said,
I

it's taken us

a

think this i5 the

Anything e1se we need take up?
M5.

JENNINGS:

No.

Your Honor.

Thank you.
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